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Abstract
We propose a new approach for modelling the functional
behaviour of an Earth observation satellite. We lever-
age this approach in order to develop a safety critical
software, a “telecommand verifier”, that is in charge of
checking onboard whether a sequence of instructions is
safe for execution. This new service is needed in order
to add more autonomy to satellites. To do so, we pro-
pose a new Domain Specific Modelling Language and
the toolchain required for integration into an embedded
software. This framework is based on the composition
of deterministic finite state machines with safety condi-
tions, timeouts, and transitions that accept durations as a
parameter. It is able to generate code in the synchronous
programming language Lustre from a high-level specifi-
cation of the satellite. This gives a formal way to derive
an event-based algorithm simulating the execution of
telecommand sequence and, thereupon, a provably cor-
rect onboard verifier.
Keywords— Formal methods, Safety, Autonomous systems,
Space systems
1 Introduction
Over the last decade, autonomy was progressively introduced
in most technological domains. This can be explained by the
necessity to add “autonomous decisions making” capabilities
to implement new functionalities or to enhance existing ones.
However, the architects of critical systems tend to oppose this
trend, which increases the complexity of validation stages and
therefore implies significantly higher costs to reach the required
levels of safety.
In the space industry, most satellites are yet entirely com-
manded from the ground, through pre-computed static mission
plan which definitely leaves room for onboard optimization.
Introducing autonomy in observation satellites would im-
prove their flexibility and responsiveness. The associated ben-
efits could range from integrating urgent requests in an ongoing
plan, to reducing the memory footprint thanks to a higher com-
pression of cloudy images. This can be achieved by allowing
onboard software to modify its own sequence of commands.
However, it should be done without impairing its safety. This
is why we carefully consider the validation of an onboard soft-
ware able to update the satellite plan by itself.
At present, observation satellites are mostly teleoperated;
they execute sequences of low level, time-tagged instructions,
named Telecommands (TC), that are generated and verified on
the ground before being uploaded. These TC sequences are
thoroughly tested to prevent the occurrence of events that may
trigger the fail-safe mechanisms of the satellite. Indeed, any
occurrence of such feared event could result in the following
chain of actions: interrupting the execution of ongoing mission
plan, shutting down all non essential systems, directing the
satellite solar panels towards the sun andwaiting for the satellite
to be taken over by satellite control experts. This event should
be avoided at all costs, since recovery may take hours to days,
duringwhich themission of the satellite is interrupted, resulting
in substantial shortfall.
A TC sequence can contains hundreds up to thousands of
instructions (depending on the covered time span) and can only
be uploaded at infrequent intervals (typically four to eight times
a day). This situation has several disadvantages. In particular,
it makes it impossible to change the satellite plan quickly, for
example to add a new, urgent mission element or to react to the
detection of clouds that could obscure the ground. In addition,
this mode of operation where the whole set of elementary TCs
is uploaded involves significant transmission of data at low rate,
which prevents the use of small ground stations.
One solution to these problems is to transmit higher level
instructions to the satellite—what we call Synthetic Telecom-
mands (STC) in Sect. 2. We can then instruct the flight software
to interpret these commands and modify its execution plan ac-
cordingly with the proper anticipation time. A key element to
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implement this new approach is to provide a software toolchain
able to “expand” an STC into low-level telecommands (with
the appropriate time-tags) and then “merge” the result into the
sequence of instructions that are already planned.
Given the criticality of the application, we seek to formally
validate the algorithms and software used in this process. This
is essentially a multi-constraints problem, since a valid se-
quence of TC must take into account strict timing constraints
(respect of deadlines); constraints on the geometry of the satel-
lite (e.g. attitude angles during image acquisition); priorities
assigned to the different missions; constraints on the memory
capacity, etc.
Validating and verifying this kind of software with the relia-
bility standards and quality level expected from space missions
is expensive and time-consuming. It mainly relies on extensive
test campaigns, with heavy simulations that can only be per-
formed on ground. Throughout the article, we propose to use
a simple software architecture that relies on a Telecommand
Verifier. The goal of this small piece of software is to accept
or reject a sequence of telecommands before its execution. On
the satellite processors, we may not rely on extensive tests and
simulation, due to the limited computational power, which is
why a new approach is required for the onboard verification
of TC sequence. However, our approach is not necessarily
limited to onboard verification: it could also replace specific
parts of the validation process performed on the ground, which
may result in significant costs reductions. More globally, one
of our goal is to evaluate the use of formal methods, such as
static analysis tools and deductive verification of programs, to
validate key elements of the software architecture of a satellite.
In order to reach the level of confidence required in criti-
cal systems, we also need to prove that this verifier is sound,
meaning that every sequence of TC vetted should be safe for
execution by the satellite controller (or at least as safe as a se-
quence generated on the ground). Lastly, we are also interested
by the completeness of our verifier, in the sense that it should
accept as many sequences as possible.
This approach is comparable to what appears in some
software frameworks that support remote code execution, such
as the Java virtual machine [13], where a bytecode verifier is
in charge of checking new code before it is executed. Our
approach shares the same advantages. First of all, it reduces
the size of the critical software components that need to be
proven correct (the “trusted computing base”). Also, it enables
a modular approach, since we can easily change the range and
the behaviour of our set of STCs without the need to modify
the rest of our software platform.
Contributions and structure of the paper. We start by giv-
ing a bird’s-eye view of the architecture of a Low Earth Orbit
observation satellite, which provides the main target of our
framework. Next, in Sect. 3, we motivate the need for adding
more autonomy and describe our approach for validating the
execution of “dynamic plans”, directly onboard, by using a
telecommand verifier. Our main contribution is a new method
for deriving this critical software from a high-level description
of the behaviour of a satellite. To this end, we define a ded-
icated, formal modelling language, called CSM (see Sect. 4),
and explain how we can reduce the problem of accepting a
sequence of TC to an acceptance problem (in the sense of for-
mal languages theory) in the CSM model. We have applied
this approach on a realistic space system, that corresponds to
the AGATA technological platform specification, and give a
complete high-level representation of the obtained model in
the diagram of Fig. 2. This model lends itself naturally to
an implementation into a synchronous language, such as Lus-
tre [9]. In Sect. 6 and 7, we show how we can exploit the
program resulting from the compilation of Lustre and discuss
the implications on the safety assessment that can be made to
strengthen our claim that the verifier is sound and valid.
2 High-Level Description of an Ob-
servation Satellite
We have experimented our approach with satellites designed
for Earth observation from Low Earth Orbit. The scope of our
case study so far is limited to the satellite model capabilities
of the AGATA technological platform specification [4], which
is able to run decision algorithms and flight software more
easily than a complete satellite simulator. Nevertheless, we
designed our approach with a focus on extensibility and we
believe that most of our work could be transposed to other
kinds of satellites.
Equipments. We can describe a satellite based on the set
of equipments that it carries. In our context, the primary
mission-related instrument is an optical imager (INSTRU-
MENT), tasked with capturing images of the ground. There
is also a collection of “smaller” equipments, such as memory
banks (MEMORY), a compressor for storage optimisation
(COMPRESSOR), as well as a signal modulator and a signal
amplifier, used for transmitting data to the ground stations
(MODULATOR and AMPLIFIER). All these equipments will
appear as separate components in our formal model, which is
summarized in Fig. 2.
Functions. Apart from these physical elements, the behaviour
of the satellite can be reduced to the management of several
high-level functions. The main purpose of the observation
satellite mission is the acquisition of data (images in our case),
using the payload (an optical instrument in our case). These
images stored in the satellite memory must be collected on the
ground, using the download function. The satellite memory
can then be freed using the data or file deletion function, to
allow the acquisition of new images. Each of these higher-level
functions will also correspond to a component in our model,
under the names RECORD (for acquisition), DOWNLOAD
and ERASE.
These functions require the satellite to always be in the right
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position and orientation, which is handled by the modes of
a transverse function: the Attitude and Orbit Control System
(AOCS). For instance, in the Geocentric Attitude Pointing
mode (GAP), the satellite main axis is roughly oriented
towards the Earth center, in order to ease data download.
Conversely, during an acquisition, the AOCS must remain in
a Custom Attitude Pointing mode (CAP), to precisely track
the proper footprint on the Earth. The third main mode of
the AOCS is called SUP (for SUn Pointing attitude), and is
used to point at the sun and maximize the battery charge from
the solar panels. Each mode will correspond to a state in the
AOCS component.
Onboard Computer and Telecommands. The last compo-
nent of this architecture is the onboard satellite controller,
which provides the satellite’s processing capability. The con-
troller host the onboard software (OBSW) that is in charge of
dispatching orders to the instruments, the communication be-
tween vital functions of the satellites, and the synchronization
and execution of telecommands.
The OBSW can be abstracted as a machine that reads its
orders from a sequence of TC and send resulting commands
to the equipments at the right date. In our context, we can
assume that the onboard software is a periodic task and that
each equipment and function can communicate with theOBSW
only at the beginning of each cycle.
Most telecommands are only required to set each equipment
of the satellite in the right mode (typically: switched-on), be-
fore performing a main function. Therefore, in our approach,
we consider only the few high-level requests that are relevant:
Acquisition, Download, Deletion andManeuver. On this basis,
we introduced the notion of Synthetic TeleCommands (STCs),
that can be decomposed into a sequence of elementary TCs
required to perform the corresponding function.
We give an example of a sequence of six TCs in Fig. 1
that corresponds to a request (an STC) for downloading an
image from memory to the ground. (In the most gen-
eral cases, an STC can correspond to up to eleven TCs.)
Essentially, it is a sequence of commands of the kind
...· MODULON(t=30,∆=16) ·...with an indication of the ab-
solute date (t) and duration (∆) of each TC.We do not consider
other types of parameters here, such as the memory address
where to read data or the position and the geometry for an
image acquisition.
As a first approximation, a sequence of TC is a timed word.
But not all sequences are safe for execution. Indeed, functions
and instruments are closely intertwined together. This gives
rise to several constraints that relate the states of the instruments
with the possible steps of a function. For example, it is unsafe
to start imaging if the satellite is pointed at the sun (whenAOCS
is in “state” SUP) since it would expose the optical instrument
to potential damages.
Some functions also introduce timeouts or timing constraints
between the occurrence of events. For instance, transmitting
an image requires to switch the modulator to state ON, which
STC Decomposition
MemoryAmpli�ierModulator
Download
MEMOFF
MODULON
MEMONAMPLION MODULOFF AMPLIOFF
MEMONt=4,	Δ=20 AMPLIONt=8,	Δ=22 MODULONt=30,	Δ=16 MODULOFFt=60,	Δ=12 AMPLIOFFt=72,	Δ=8 MEMOFFt=74,	Δ=15
Figure 1: Decomposition of an STC into the correspond-
ing TC sequence.
takes a specific time related to physical constraints (defined as
a constant DURATION_MODULON in the documentation).
In the following, we develop a formal model that can be used
to describe, in an unambiguous way, whether a sequence of TC
is safe. Our main objective is to derive a TC verifier from this
specification. The role of this critical software element is to
reject TC sequences that could harm the satellite’s mission.
In the next section, we motivate the notion of STC and
explain why the STC decomposition (and the verification of
the result) should take place onboard.
3 Motivation of our Approach
The addition of Synthetic TC is a newproposal that ismotivated
as a way to introduce more autonomy, allowing a satellite to
perform some of its mission planning onboard. It also reduces
the amount (and granularity) of data to be transmitted between
the ground and the board. This extension has an impact on
the dependability of the system. Indeed, the onboard decom-
position of an STC is not unique since it depends on multiple
factors, such as equipments status and variables (e.g. attitude
precision), or the chaining of sequences of STCs. The latter
may result in optimization such as keeping an equipment ON if
it will be used in consecutive STCs. Therefore, it is not always
feasible to test all the possible results of an STC decomposition
on the ground, before uploading it for execution.
Actually, our approach is not specifically tailored to the way
STCs are exploited by the onboard software. This allows us to
introduce new extensions incrementally. For instance, in a first
class of autonomy, the satellite may (only) dynamically insert
newTCs in its work plan, depending on the STC decomposition
strategy. But we may also envision higher classes of autonomy
where a satellite may choose to schedule or delete an STC
dynamically, depending on unpredictable chains of events. For
instance, the detection of clouds in an image may lead to its
deletion and save memory space, for additional pictures to be
captured. Finally, we can even consider cases where the choice
depends on the result of some (black-box) decision algorithm.
A discussion on autonomy in the AGATA platform that we
target can be found in [16].
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The potential optimizations or the ability to consider on-
board events and modify the plan accordingly, when out of
reach of a ground station, are among the strongest arguments in
favour of performing the STC decomposition on board. How-
ever, its result should be safe for execution by the satellite, to
ensure the continuity of the mission. A way to reduce the com-
plexity of this task is to verify the sequences of TCs that result
from these decompositions. Nevertheless, several issues must
be solved in order to build a TC sequence verifier.
In the following sections, we describe the behaviour of
the satellite using a domain-specific notation and we use this
model to define what is an admissible sequence of TCs. For the
purpose of this work, we compare our behavioural model of the
satellite with a System Requirements Specification document
(SRS) that lists the expected functions and features related
to the operation of the satellite. For instance, the particular
behaviour of the modulator system that we mentioned above,
corresponds to requirement REQ_DOWN_02 below, which also
entails that the signal amplifier must be ON when we power-on
the modulator:
REQ_DOWN_02: Switch modulator to ON.
The modulator is ON after duration ∆ DURATION_MODULON
initial condition = Amplifier is ON
Overall, we need to define exactly what it means that a TC
sequence is admissible. This property may depend on the state
of the satellite when the execution starts. Hence we need to
define what are the “reachable states” of the satellite, and what
is the effect of executing a command from a state. Finally, we
want to provide an (operational) method to effectively accept
or refuse a TC sequence.
We provide a solution to each of these problems. Our main
idea is to use an automata-based framework to describe the be-
haviour of each equipment and function. Then the behaviour
of the whole system can be defined as the symbolic composi-
tion of all our automata with a component that represents the
onboard software (OBSW). To this end, we propose a model in
which transitions can be triggered by a command (modelling
the reception of an order from the controller) or by a timeout
(modelling the end of an activity). We also provide a way to
associate an invariant to a state (a boolean expression on the
states of the system) that can trigger an error when a condition
is not met. In this context, invariants correspond to error cases
identified in the specification.
4 Formal Models
In the following, we describe the formal models used in our
work. We provide two different ways (or notations) to express
the same model: a graphical notation that is more suited for
code review; then an equivalent textual notation, that is easier
to handle with tools, for code generation and code analysis
activities.
We use the textual syntax as our “pivot” notation and provide
a way to generate the graphical model automatically from the
code in our toolchain. Themain purpose of the graphicalmodel
is to ease the review of the model and the traceability with the
SRS.
4.1 Graphical Notation
We display the complete graphical model of the satellite in
Fig. 2. Each component (equipment or function) is named and
appears in the form of a finite state machine. We also list, in
each case, the identifiers of the requirements in the SRS that
relates to the behaviour of the component.
We distinguish steady states (plain lines)—where we await
orders from the controller—from transient states (dashed),
where we await for the end of a timeout. In this case, a timeout
is modelled by an outgoing, dotted transition associated with
a duration. Each component has a unique initial state which is
necessarily steady. It is displayed using a thick black border.
Other conventions of our model include: there is always
at least one transient state between two steady states; each
transient state is the source of exactly one transition (a timeout).
This reflects some strong invariants in the conception of a
satellite: (1) it is not possible to change state without receiving
a TC from the onboard controller; (2) the change of state is
deterministic and the OBSW can always predict which steady
state a TC should switch to (after some finite duration).
If we focus on the automaton for theModulator equipment,
we see that it can be in only two possible steady states: the ini-
tial state, OFF, and the ON state. Another information given by
the diagram is that only the MODULON telecommand can cause
a transition out of the steady state OFF; which results in the
Modulator staying in the transient state WAITON for a (constant)
duration equal to DURATION_MODULON. This information corre-
sponds to requirement REQ_DOWN_02 of the SRS, that we used
as an example in the previous section.
In order to represent constraints between equipments or
functions, we also define a notation for invariants—displayed
inside square brackets—that can be associated to either
telecommands (I) or specific states (II) as follows:
(I) Invariants on telecommands are displayed as transition
guards that must be true when the TC is received, oth-
erwise the whole TC sequence is rejected (failures are
permanent). For instance, the telecommand MODULON is
valid only whenAMPLIFIER is in state ON (during the cy-
cle when the TC was dispatched). This is the last element
in requirement REQ_DOWN_02.
(II) For invariants on states, the implicit behaviour is that a
component immediately triggers an error when the in-
variant is false. An example can be found on the transient
state READ of the Download automaton. Intuitively, this
means that theMemory Output and theModulator should
stay ON the whole timewe are downloading an image from
the satellite to the ground.
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Figure 2: Complete graphical model of satellite functions and equipments.
One of the reasons that explain the conciseness of this graph-
ical notation is that we do not need to make explicit many of
the “error conditions” of the satellite behaviour. Indeed, we as-
sume an error when we receive a telecommand that cannot be
processed. For example, it is an error if theModulator receives
a MODULON command while in state ON. Adding these kinds of
error invariants, for instance by adding a dedicated “sink state”,
would greatly overload our diagrams.
We can also remark that the OBSW is the only component,
defined in Sect. 2, that is not explicitly represented in the
model. This is because the behaviour of the onboard controller
is fixed. Intuitively, we can think of the OBSW as the compo-
nent responsible for dispatching the TC and checking that the
invariants hold.
The resulting model is not far from other timed formal lan-
guages, such as Timed Automata [1] for example. One major
difference, though, is that wemay sometimes receive a duration
together with a TC. This is the case in the transition on telecom-
mand CLEARFILE of the Erase component/function, originating
from state IDLE. This formal parameter, called DELTA here, mod-
els the fact that the operation of deleting a file is not performed
in constant time, but depends on its actual size (number of
memory sectors that need to be cleared). In practice, the value
of DELTA is part of the TC that is dispatched from the onboard
controller to the Erase function and is available to the OBSW
when we check the sequence of TC.
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const DURATION_MODULON 2
const DURATION_MODULOFF 3
const DURATION_DELFILE 1
const DURATION_CLEARFILE 1
# REQ_DOWN_02 , REQ_DOWN_06
block MODULATOR :=
init (OFF)
tc MODULON (OFF,WAITON,ON)
{DURATION_MODULON}
tc MODULOFF (ON,WAITOFF,OFF)
{DURATION_MODULOFF}
guard (MODULON)[AMPLIFIER:ON]
# REQ_DEL_01 , REQ_DEL_02
block ERASE :=
init (IDLE)
tc DELFILE (IDLE,DEL,IDLE)
{DURATION_DELFILE}
tcd (DELTA)
CLEARFILE (IDLE,WAIT,CLEAR,IDLE)
{DURATION_CLEARFILE , DELTA}
guard (DELFILE) [MEMORY:ON]
inv (CLEAR) [MEMORY:ON]
Listing 1: Textual representation of the Modulator
equipment and the Erase function in the Compact Satel-
lite Model syntax.
4.2 Compact Satellite Model
To simplify our tooling, we designed an equivalent textual
syntax; a programming language called the Compact Satellite
Model, or CSM for short. This language can be used to formally
describe satellite requirements. As an example, we provide the
CSM specification of the Modulator and Erase functions in
Listing 1.
In the CSM, each component definition starts with the key-
word block followed by the declaration of the initial state—
given after the keyword init. This state usually represents the
equipment or the function when not in use (OFF or IDLE in our
running example). The rest of the block is a list of transitions
and invariants declarations.
A transition is defined with the keyword tc and declares
a sequence, between parenthesis, that starts and ends with a
steady state (the source and destination states) and that enu-
merates all the possible transient states in-between, in order.
The delays needed to exit these transient states are given be-
tween braces and can refer to durations that are listed in the
SRS (such as {DURATION_MODULON} for instance). This notation
makes explicit the constraint that there is at most one sequence
of “transient transitions” between every pair of steady states
(for a given TC).
We make a distinction between regular transitions, tc, and
delta telecommands, declared with the keyword tcd, whose
timeout depends on a duration that is passed as a parameter of
the TC. We have already described this behaviour in previous
section, for the transition CLEARFILE of the Erase component.
Finally, we use keywords guard for declaring a guard on
telecommands and inv for declaring a guard on states, like in
cases (I) and (II) discussed with the graphical notation. In-
variants are the reason why we may not always replace a (de-
terministic) sequence of timeouts with a single transition. For
instance, if we look at the sequence of transient states visited
after a CLEARFILE telecommand in component Erase, we see
that invariant [MEMORY:ON] applies in state CLEAR, but not in
state WAIT. This means that it is not forbidden to request a file
deletion when the Memory is OFF, but is should be ON before
the Erase function reaches the CLEAR state.
Finally, as in the graphical model, the traceability between
code and requirements is made simple by the modularity of
the language: we can specify a list of requirements identifier
inside the comments of each block (line beginning with the
symbol #).
4.3 Design Principles for the CSM
Many of the decisions taken when defining our modelling lan-
guage are based on the following design principles:
1. The model should be readable by any satellite expert that
took part in writing the satellite specification document,
without any particular knowledge of formal methods.
2. Building the CSM model from the initial, informal spec-
ification should not be too tedious or unnecessarily com-
plex.
3. Building the CSMmodel should ideally not require more
time than writing the usual spreadsheet, or document in
tabular format, used to gather system requirements.
The first design principle motivates the choice of an
ad-hoc formalism—a Domain Specific Modelling Language
(DSML)—since it does not require the user to be familiar with
a pre-existing technology. This helps the verification process,
since the formal model should be reviewed by domain experts,
and not software architects. This also motivates our choice
of a notation that is close to “state machines”, since the SRS
already includes state diagrams in some of their requirements.
These two design principle help avoid errors and reduce the
time spent by architects on mindless, repetitive tasks. For in-
stance, the last design principle implies that the CSM model
should not contain more details than the SRS and therefore
prevent from adding non-essential requirements or invariants.
These goals are achieved by designing a language that is tai-
lored towards the exact level of abstraction needed for the task
and that integrates the specificities of our application domain.
For example, we rely on the fact that a satellite equipment is
inherently time deterministic (it can only accept orders coming
from the onboard software, OBSW, at a precise date, and the
OBSWcan predict in which state every equipment and function
will be in the future). This can also be observed in our very
lightweight treatment of errors. This would not be possible
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with a “general purpose” behavioural specification language
which, by definition, requires every details to be made explicit.
There are other incentives for using a dedicated and “agnos-
tic” approach, that is unbiased towards any particular technol-
ogy. In particular, it may help us take into account changes
in the satellite architecture more easily. Moreover, we could
imagine using the CSMmodel for something else than deriving
our TC verifier; wemention a possible use for generating cover-
ing tests in Sect. 7. Finally, the choice of a dedicated language
for behavioural specification can shield us from problems that
could arise if we decide to change our target platform. For
example, in an initial prototype of our approach, we experi-
mented with a toolchain targeting a subset of the C language,
the ANSI C Specification Language (ACSL), and a deductive
verification approach based on the use of Frama-C [12]. We
eventually decided to select Lustre for our work, since the gen-
erated program invariants (the ACSL part) were too complex
in our use case.
5 Verification of TC Sequence
The core of our approach relies on the fact that we can express
the problem of accepting a TC sequence as a (timed-word)
acceptance problem on the CSM model. Indeed, a sequence
of TC can be interpreted as an execution trace of the whole
model in which all commands are triggered and no errors are
produced. As a consequence, a TC verifier can be directly
derived from this definition by implementing an interpreter
and running it on the TC sequence. In our work, we define the
interpreter using the synchronous language Lustre and extract
an executable from it by compiling the result into C code.
The Compact Satellite Model depicted in Sect. 4.2 does
not support any acceptance function as is. However, most of
its design is based on classical automata formalisms, such as
Timed Automata [1]; the Discrete Event System specification
(DEVS) of [5]; or the Timed Transition Systems of [10]. For
instance, like in the DEVSmodel, every state is associated with
a given lifespan (which is infinite in the case of steady states)
and there is a single transition associated with the event of a
state reaching its lifespan. Therefore we can easily define a
notion of (timed) trace acceptance for CSM.
Many specificities of our framework make this definition
simpler. First, every TC targets only one particular equip-
ment or function (there is no synchronization between compo-
nents). Also, interactions between equipments and functions
are always mediated by the OBSW, that operates on a fixed
cycle1. Consequently, we can reason using a discrete time
model, where each “tick” is synchronized with the clock of
the controller. Finally, every timing constraint is punctual and
can be expressed as a number of execution cycles (there is no
uncertainty on the duration of an event and therefore no need
1The frequency of this cycle may be quite low. For instance, in the
first generation of SPOT satellites, the frequency of the controller is of
only 8Hz.
to use time intervals).
On the other hand, we need to take into account timeouts sit-
uations (the fact that time elapses) and also the fact that several
commands may be issued at the same date, and therefore that
multiple components may trigger transitions simultaneously.
Another major difference with other popular timed models is
that some telecommands take a timeout (duration) as a pa-
rameter. This is the case, for instance, with the telecommand
CLEARFILE, which takes a formal parameter (called DELTA) in
the tcd transition of block ERASE in Listing 1. The value of
this parameter, when the TC is executed, gives the duration
that should be spent in state CLEAR before moving to IDLE (see
Fig. 2). This means that we may possibly deal with an infi-
nite number of transitions—one for each value of DELTA—even
though, in practice, we could bound the duration parameters.
For the sake of brevity, we cannot give a complete and pre-
cise presentation of the formal semantics for the CSM language
here. Let us just say that we have defined a structural opera-
tional semantics for the CSM based on a small step reduction
relation (in the style typically used in concurrency semantics)
and can define the meaning of a CSM model as a Labelled
Transition System (LTS) with discrete transitions representing
the evaluation of telecommands; internal (or silent) transitions
representing local changes in the state of a component (typically
the effect of a timeout); and “continuous” transitions represent-
ing the passage of time. With this semantics it is possible to
prove that our CSM model of Fig. 2 is “time-deterministic”.
Actually, for any system that meets the constraints listed in
Sect. 4.1, we could prove that a given TC sequence corresponds
to at most one path in the LTS; and situations of deadlocks
means that the sequence should be rejected.
In this context, the executions (or traces) accepted by a
CSM model are exactly the finite paths in its labelled transi-
tion system, starting from the initial state. It is not necessary
to compute the whole LTS to test if a given TC sequence is
admissible. We only need to “execute” the formal semantics
and to check, at each step, that the invariants described in the
CSM model are true. Also, we can easily extend this notion of
acceptance to any given reachable state in the LTS (instead of
only the initial state).
5.1 Choices of Operational Semantics
We can define two main categories of semantics for the CSM.
A first possibility is to define a “cycle accurate” interpreter,
in which we simulate the evolution of the system at each cy-
cle. This corresponds to following each discrete transition in
the LTS. If all events are accepted and constraints between au-
tomata are respected, the simulation continues; otherwise the
sequence is rejected and we can report the last safe state of
the system. This approach is easy to implement, but it may be
sub-optimal.
Another possibility is to build a “discrete-event” interpreter,
wherewe can simply skip to the next instantwhere ameaningful
event occurs (a TC or a timeout). This can speed up the
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Figure 3: Framework overview.
interpreter, but it requires to build a list combining TC start
dates and computed timeouts, and to sort this list in increasing
order.
We have experimented with the two approaches in our work.
In each case, we can provide an encoding of the system model
using a translation into the synchronous programming language
Lustre. This process is made simple by the fact that we can
encode each automata separately and compose them by com-
bining together common events. We have mostly concentrated
our efforts on the “cycle accurate” version of the TC verifier,
since it leads to much simpler code and therefore is simpler to
review during the safety assessment.
5.2 On the Unfolding of STC
In this work, we advocate an approach that is somewhat similar
to the one of Proof-Carrying Code (PCC) [15], a software
mechanism that allows a host system (a satellite in our case)
to check that it is safe to execute a program supplied by an
untrusted source.
It would not be realistic to develop a simple, onboard verifier
at the level of synthetic telecommands. Basically, each STC
can be compiled into a fixed sequence of TC. This is the simple
part. Then we need to insert, or weave, the resulting sequence
into the commands that are already scheduled by the onboard
software. Inserting a TC sequence into an existing one is a dif-
ficult problem when you want to optimize the result. Indeed,
even a slight change in the order of TC can have far-reaching
consequences. For example, delaying the capture of an image
because we have inserted a conflicting command may result
in a longer time spent changing the orientation of the satellite
(to compensate for the change in the direction that the AOCS
needs to point to). Therefore the expansion of an STC is also
a scheduling and planning problem, subject to multi-objective
optimization constraints: we want to acquire a maximum num-
ber of usable images; while balancing the memory allocation;
and taking into account the opportunities to download images
that have already been taken. In order to be competitive with
plans computed from the ground—that is to compute a sched-
ule that is as close as possible to an “optimal” one—we need
to use heuristics and techniques from Operational Research.
And it will be very complex to prove the safety of such an STC
unfolding and optimization engine.
In our solution, we separate the safety aspects of the problem
from the computational one. We do not require any knowledge
on the way a new TC schedule is computed from the previous
one. We consider the result TC sequence as an “untrusted
source”, to quote the PCC approach, and provide a mechanism
to check that it is safe for execution.
6 Overview of our Framework
We describe our global approach with the diagram in Fig. 3.
The starting point is a set of high-level requirements (in our
example we have chosen the description of a satellite from the
Spot-1 family). These requirements cover the main equipments
of the satellite, as well as the AOCS modes and the mission-
related functions that we described in Sect. 2: acquisition,
download, memory management, etc.
The first step consists in deriving a CSM specification from
the requirements. Each equipment should typically correspond
to a different CSM block and each telecommand can be defined
using the keywords tc and tcd. The associated durations are
also used in these macro commands, as they will correspond to
timeouts exiting a transient state. If an initial condition must
be fulfilled, an inv or a guard should be built accordingly,
as defined in Sect. 4.2. The resulting model remains very
compact. For example, in our use case, the CSM of the whole
satellite specification (three pages of requirements) fit into two
pages of code.
Once the CSM is obtained, it is used as input by a code
generator that can output both: (1) the graphical model in
Graphviz’s DOT language [6]; and (2) a set of components
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written in the synchronous language Lustre that implements
(time-compatible) “interpreters” for each block in the CSM.
The automata model preserves the modularity and compact-
ness of the CSM and can be displayed on a single page. It can
be used later on to ease and improve confidence during the ver-
ification process between CSM and specification. Concerning
the Lustre code, we give a high-level view of the structure of
the generated code below.
The last step in our framework is to derive the TC verifier
by compiling the Lustre code. For this, we can use one of
the many Lustre compiler that are currently available such as
compiler that are formally verified [8] or even certified [3].
Our objective is to use a certified toolchain in order to reach
the level of safety required in the space industry and to obtain
a C program behaviourally equivalent to the Lustre code. We
review the different parts of this framework again in Sect. 7,
when we discuss safety issues,
6.1 Structure of the Generated Lustre
We generate a set of Lustre nodes (or blocks) that correspond
to the components of the CSM model. Each node can read
telecommands by looking at a specific signals (which are on
when the command is called), and similarly with durations (in-
terpreted as a signal that is on when a timeout ends). Every
node (CSM component) can communicate with a central con-
troller, which can be compared with the OBSW component
described in Sect. 2, in charge of synchronizing the telecom-
mands and of checking invariants between components. The
composition of all these components can be used in a Lustre
simulator, such as Luciole [7], to check the validity of a TC
sequence against the specification.
Each node takes as input a dedicated list of telecommand
signals and the corresponding duration parameters if any, and
returns its current state. It handles its own local timers which
are usually armed upon the reception of a telecommand, and
is able to modify its return state accordingly. Finally, it is also
responsible for verifying the compliance between current state
and signals received. Each node has a dedicated error signal,
connected to the OBSW node. It will return an error state if
its structural constraints are not respected (for instance when a
node receives a telecommand while not in the expected state).
The role of the OBSW node is to collect the distributed state
of every equipment and function nodes in order to compute the
global view of the system. This centralized state controller can
be used for the verification of guards and invariants that involve
multiple nodes.
The structure of the generated code reflects the modularity
of the CSM specification. This is useful in our case since it
means that we can review the generated code in a modular way;
component by component.
7 Safety Assessment
This section focuses on the arguments that support our confi-
dence on the TC verifier obtained with our framework.
One of our main objective is to derive a TC verifier, from
a set of satellite requirements, while both: (1) increasing our
confidence on the tool (for safety reasons); and (2) reducing as
much as possible the need for a human review of the code (for
limiting costs and development time).
To this end, we have designed the CSM language with the
goal to limit, as much as possible, the semantic distance be-
tween requirements and specifications. While we still need to
manually review the CSM code to check its compliance with
the requirements, we are able to do this in only one day in our
current use case. This ismainly achieved thanks to two comple-
mentary factors. First, the possibility to automatically generate
a graphical representation from a CSM model2, which sim-
plifies proofreading activities. Second, the possibility to link
requirements with transitions in the CSM model relying on
traceability through specific comments. It gives the possibility
to perform an analysis of “model coverage”.
At the other end of the workflow of Fig. 3, the safety of the
compilation step from Lustre to C relies on the use of certified
compilers, and therefore do not need human intervention.
What is left to do is to monitor the transformation step from
CSM to Lustre. For illustrative purpose, in our use case, the
Lustre code derived from our CSM code is only a “few pages
long” and could be written by hand in a few days at most. This
is to be compared with the several thousands lines of code in
the generated C code.
As described in Sect. 6, we provide an automatic compiler
written in OCaml, able to generate the Lustre code from a
CSMfile. The choice of an intermediate synchronous language
preserves the level of abstraction of the CSM, which is by
extension the same as the specification itself. Therefore the
generated code can be easily reviewed by a Lustre expert since
it is only an order of magnitude larger than the original CSM
code. Moreover, we can take advantage of the modularity of
both languages to perform this verification block per block, and
extend the requirements traceability up to this stage.
We are currently exploring ways to increase our confidence
on this intermediate step, most of them relying on tests coverage
comparisons. For example, it is possible to generate from the
specification the exhaustive list of minimal TC sequences that
lead to an error, and check the complete coverage of these error
cases using the generated code. It is also possible to generate
exhaustive covering tests directly from the Lustre code, using
a tool like GATeL [14]. These tests can then be fed to a
“reference space simulator”, such as the AGATA platform, to
check that a sequence accepted by the verifier cannot trigger a
safety violation in the simulator.
2We could increase our confidence by “certifying” the generation
of the graphical model, something that is made easier by the high
modularity of this transformation.
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8 Related Work and Conclusion
Autonomy is not a new principle for space systems. As such,
our work can be viewed as a step forward in order to increase
autonomy at the level of mission planning and execution (see
the various levels of satellite functionalities classified in [11]).
In particular, we propose a software architecture able to support
the addition of Synthetic TC and define a cost-effective method
for deriving a critical component for this architecture.
Our approach relies on a new formal model for describing
the functional behaviour of satellites. We show how to leverage
this model in order to develop a safety critical software—a TC
verifier—that is in charge of checking, onboard, whether a
sequence of instructions is safe for execution. We also show
how this verifier can be used to increase autonomy without
sacrificing safety.
Our modelling framework is based on the composition of
deterministic finite state machines extended with safety con-
ditions and timeouts. This is close, in spirit, to several other
formal models, such as the Discrete Event System specification
(DEVS) of [5] or Timed Automata [1]. Moreover, our model
lends itself well to a “compilation” into Lustre. Therefore, we
may have the possibility to reuse some existing formal verifica-
tion methods and tools (such as model simulation or automatic
test generation) and adapt them to our needs. However, our
formal modelling language is also interesting in its own right,
since it encompasses many of the “good practices” found in
space systems—such as time determinism—and enforces them
in the form of syntactical constraints.
For future work, we expect to extend our approach to other
classes of satellites and to apply it to other problems. For
instance, we would like to reuse our formal models to gener-
ate more test cases, with a better coverage, when testing new
onboard planning algorithms. Also, in the context of safety
assessment (see Sect. 7), our toolchain still requires human re-
view for several artefacts, and in particular for the Lustre node
generated from the CSM blocks. Automatic verification of the
transformation from CSM to Lustre, using formal techniques,
is out of the scope of our work at the moment. Nonetheless,
we could imagine adapting techniques used in the formal ver-
ification of model-based transformation [2] to prove that we
preserve the semantics of our models in the compilation. We
also mention how we could use automatic test generation tools,
like GATeL, in order to gain more trust on this step.
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